Da li je filozofija nauka?

Zasto sociolog (sto BT nije) ne bi bio stranacka licnost.. nista mi nije jasno?

Društvenu nadgradnju sačinjavaju sve ostale oblasti društvene stvarnosti koje su u krajnjoj liniji uslovljene ekonomskom osnovom društva. To su grubo diferencirano društveno-politička organizacija društva (država, pravne institucije, političke organizacije) i društvena svest koja se sastoji iz pravno-političke nadgradnje i viših oblika svesti (religija, moral, filozofija, nauka i umetnost)

...video bi da filosofija obuhvata dosta pod-disciplina.

Filozofija je dobrim delom nauka

ono sto si ti ucio (a verovatno si izblejao) u srednjoj skoli zove se u stvari istorija filosofije i kao takva jeste naucna disciplina.

The scientific method is a sequence or collection of procedures that are considered characteristic of scientific investigation and the acquisition of new scientific knowledge based upon physical evidence. This method is believed to distinguish science from other intellectual traditions, such as painting, philosophy or theology.

Šiksa – nauka o pravilnom artikuliranju vedskih himni i mantri.
Chanda – nauka o metričkom pjevanju vedskih himni

...kada pokusavas da uvredis gojka pa mu kazes, da se drzi cisco servera, tada vise ti zvucis glupo nego gojko :)

pctelti si kritikovao skolski sistem gde se iz dva predmeta daju suprotno tumacenje, a ja sam samo primetio da vazni "reformisti" imaju stav da nije nauka...

Ako je filozofija nauka i u to nema nikakve sumnje, zasto se onda kaze filozofija, nauka a ne samo nauka? Izraz "nauka i filozofija" se koristi toliko cesto, da to coveku koji veruje da je filozofija nauka moze da smeta.

Tacno je to za poddiscipline (koje su nauke), jer mislim da izdvajanjem npr. matematike kao nauke filozofija ne prestaje da se bavi matematickim pitanjima, tako da je matematika i dalje poddisciplina filozofije... ili nije?

Ako filozofija kao kompleksna disciplina moze sadrzati u sebi 99% nauke i 1% nenauke (da se tako nepravilno izrazim), to znaci da onda nije nauka. Imajuci to u vidu, mi ovoga puta mozemo zanemariti onih 99% i dalju paznju usmeriti samo na ovih 1% - postoji ili ne? E jos kada Dimkovic kaze:
onda ja pocinjem da se pitam sta je sa losim :-) delom.

Ako ja dobro razumem engleski, kaze da naucni metod razlikuje nauku od filozofije. Da li je to konacan odgovor?

Dakle, svi ono sto proucavaju nazivaju naukom... ali ipak da krenemo od pocenta:

Kako neki elementi ličnosti obavezno idu skupa, uvek se iznenadim iako znam da je to za očekivati. pctel, hvala ti, ti si najbolja potvrda te teorije.

Gojko, zamolio bih te da se vise drzis svojih Cisco servera, a ako danas ne radis onda citaj "Svet" ...

vise ti zvucis glupo nego gojko

Bilo kako bilo, dobro bi bilo da se ubuduce gojko, ti i ja vise drzimo teme, a manje psihoanalize.

dimković
Formalno gledano, jedino prirodne nauke mogu da zadovolje postojanje naucnog metoda baziranog na kontrolisanom eksperimentu, no to je jasno i bez nekih formalizama

caboom:
elem, jedna od osnovnih postavki logike je da ako podjes od pogresnih pretpostavki dolazis (osim ako ne napravis neobicne logicke greske, ili se kockice neobicno poklope) do pogresnog zakljucka.

jelena:
Meni nije jasno misljenje (koje se ne tako retko moze cuti) da ono sto se ne moze izucavati metodom prirodnih nauka, ni ne treba izucavati.

-zombie:
samo usput, po logici, vrlo je moguće doći do tačnih zaključaka čak iako počneš od pogrešnih pretpostavki (i naravno koristiš samo zakone logike). seti se samo tablice istinitosti za matematičku operaciju sledi, tj F→T je istinit iskaz. po logici, jedino je nemoguće na osnovu tačnih pretpostavki (i naravno, koristeći samo zakone logike), doći do netačnog zaključka.. na tom postulatu se i zasniva cela logika..

In my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, 51, I already proposed a first classification of the sciences in accordance with the form of the principle of sufficient reason which reigns in them ; and I also touched upon it again in 7 and 1 5 of the first volume of this work.


I will give here a small attempt at such a classification, which will yet no doubt be susceptible of much improve ment and perfecting :

I. Pure a priori Sciences.

1. The doctrine of the ground of being.

(a.) In space : Geometry.
(b.) In time : Arithmetic and Algebra.

2. The doctrine of the ground of knowing : Logic.

II. Empirical or a posteriori Sciences. All based upon the ground of becoming, i.e., the law of causalty, and upon the three modes of that law.

1. The doctrine of causes.

(a.) Universal : Mechanics, Hydrodynamics, Physics, Chemistry.
(b.) Particular : Astronomy, Mineralogy, Geo logy, Technology, Pharmacy.

2. The doctrine of stimuli.

(a.) Universal : Physiology of plants and animals, together with the ancillary science, Anatomy.
(b.) Particular : P>otany, Zoology, Zootomy, Comparative Physiology, Pathology, Therapeutics.

3. The doctrine of motives.

(a.) Universal : Ethics, Psychology.
(b.) Particular : Jurisprudence, History.


Philosophy or Metaphysics, as the doctrine of conscious ness and its contents in general, or of the whole of expe rience as such, does not appear in the list, because it does not at once pursue the investigation which the principle of sufficient reason prescribes, but first has this principle itself as its object. It is to be regarded as the thorough bass of all sciences, but belongs to a higher class than they do, and is almost as much related to art as to science. As in music every particular period must correspond to the tonality to which thorough bass has advanced, so every author, in proportion to the line he follows, must bear the stamp of the philosophy which prevails in his time. But besides this, every science has also its special philosophy ; and therefore we speak of the philosophy of botany, of zo ology, of history, &c. By this we must reasonably under stand nothing more than the chief results of each science itself, regarded and comprehended from the highest, that is the most general, point of view which is possible within that science. These general results connect themselves directly with general philosophy, for they supply it with important data, and relieve it from the labour of seeking these itself in the philosophically raw material of the special sciences. These special philosophies therefore stand as a mediating link between their special sciences and philosophy proper. For since the latter has to give the most general explanations concerning the whole of things, these must also be capable of being brought down and applied to the individual of every species of thing. The philosophy of each science, however, arises indepen dently of philosophy in general, from the data of its own science itself. Therefore it does not need to wait till that philosophy at last be found ; but if worked out in advance it will certainly agree with the true universal philosophy. This, on the other hand, must be capable of receiving confirmation and illustration from the philosophies of the particular sciences ; for the most general truth must be capable of being proved through the more special truths. Goethe has afforded a beautiful example of the philosophy of zoology in his reflections on Dalton s and Pander s skeletons of rodents (Hefte zur Morphologic, 1824). And like merit in connection with the same science belongs to Kielmayer, Delamark, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Cuvier, and many others, in that they have all brought out clearly the complete analogy, the inner relation ship, the permanent type, and systematic connection of animal forms. Empirical sciences pursued purely for their own sake and without philosophical tendency are like a face without eyes. They are, however, a suitable occupation for men of good capacity who yet lack the highest faculties, which would even be a hindrance to minute investigations of such a kind. Such men concen trate their whole power and their whole knowledge upon one limited field, in which, therefore, on condition of re maining in entire ignorance of everything else, they can attain to the most complete knowledge possible; while the philosopher must survey all fields of knowledge, and indeed to a certain extent be at home in them; and thus that complete knowledge which can only be at tained by the study of detail is necessarily denied him. Therefore the former may be compared to those Geneva workmen of whom one makes only wheels, another only springs, and a third only chains. The philosopher, on the other hand, is like the watchmaker, who alone pro duces a whole out of all these which has motion and significance. They may also be compared to the musi cians of an orchestra, each of whom is master of his own instrument ; and the philosopher, on the other hand, to the conductor, who must know the nature and use of every instrument, yet without being able to play them, all, or even one of them, with great perfection. Scotus Erigena includes all sciences under the name Scientia, in opposi tion to philosophy, which he calls Sapientia. The same distinction was already made by the Pythagoreans ; as may be seen from Stobseus (Floril, vol. i. p. 20), where it is very clearly and neatly explained. But a much happier and more piquant comparison of the relation of the two kinds of mental effort to each other has been so often repeated by the ancients that we no longer know to whom it belongs. Diogenes Laertius (ii. 79) attributes it to Aristippus, Stobseus {Floril., tit. iv. no) to Aristo of Chios ; the Scholiast of Aristotle ascribes it to him (p. 8 of the Berlin edition), but Plutarch (De Puer. Educ., c. 10) attributes it to Bio " Qui ajebat, sicut Penelopes prod,
quum non possent cum Penelope concumbere, rem cum ejus ancillis habuissent ; ita qui philosophiam nequeunt appre- hendere eos in alliis nullius pretii diciplinis sese conterere." In our predominantly empirical and historical age it can do no harm to recall this.

A najbolje što su dodali pravila zaključivanja i slično.